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Abstract: The Malaysian Shariah Advisory Council (‘SAC’), established  
under the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 (Act 701), acts as an authority for 
the ascertainment of Islamic law in the operation of Islamic Financial 
Institutions (‘IFIs’). Its decision is binding on all IFIs, the Bank Negara 
Malaysia, the Shariah Committee, the court of law and the arbitrators in 
Malaysia. Nonetheless, this power may be abused by the SAC to the detriment 
of the customer stakeholders as the SAC is immune from any legal action. This 
paper aims to examine the features and legal issues of the SAC. The 
examination uses legal research methodology. This paper finds that the 
immunity conferred on the SAC should be abolished and be subject to the 
judicial scrutiny for the benefits of the IFIs’ development in Malaysia. At the 
ending part of this paper, the authors provide certain recommendations in 
regard to the issues discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
Islamic banking and financial businesses in Malaysia are governed by the Islamic 
Financial Services Act 2013 (Act 759) (IFSA) and the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 
2009 (Act 701) (CBMA). Pursuant to section 2 of the IFSA, ‘Islamic banking business’, 
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inter alia, means the business of Islamic deposits on current account, deposit account, 
savings account or other similar accounts, with or without the business of paying or 
collecting cheques drawn by or paid in by customers and accepting money under an 
investment account.  
The affairs and operations of Islamic banking and financial business in Malaysia are 
subject to the control and advice of the Shariah Advisory Committee (‘SAC’) under the 
Malaysian Central Bank (Bank Negara Malaysia) (‘BNM’) pursuant to the provisions 
under IFSA and CBMA. Apart from this, all Islamic banking and financial business 
operators in Malaysia are obligated to establish their respective Shariah Committees 
(‘SC’) to advise them in their affairs and operations. This is spelt out under IFSA. The 
SAC and SC are duty bound to apply and comply with the requirements of Shariah 
(Islamic Law) in dispensing with their statutory duties (section 32 of IFSA; sections 
51(1), 57 and 58 of CBMA). 
2 Issue 
The issue that this paper deals with is in regard to the immunity and superiority of the 
SAC. This feature is in accordance with the provisions of IFSA and CBMA. It is opined 
that the immunity and superiority conferred on the SAC may be abusive and can be 
detrimental to the rights and interests of the customer stakeholders in IFIs. There may be 
SAC’s decisions relating to Islamic banking/financial products that are not compatible 
with Islamic law and equity. As the SAC is conferred with statutory immunity and 
superiority, no person or no court of law can correct and rectify the wrong decisions, 
either procedural or substantive, made by the SAC.  
For an instance, Bay’ Bithaman al-Ajil (BBA) (i.e., sale by deferred payment) being 
an Islamic banking/financial product as practised in Malaysia is legal according to the 
SAC. Nonetheless, the SAC fails to envisage the issue of failed housing development 
projects owing to the faults of the housing developers in BBA. In failed housing projects, 
the aggrieved purchasers who use BBA to finance the purchase of houses are still 
required to pay monthly instalments to the Islamic banks despite not having obtained 
vacant possession of the duly completed housing units and suffered various grievances. 
There is no term in the BBA that provides aggrieved purchasers in failed housing projects 
with any adequate remedies and rights against gharar (uncertainty and inability of the 
bank/developer to deliver duly completed house) and losses. However, under Islamic law, 
the vendor (the bank/developer) should ensure that the housing projects can be delivered 
to the purchasers. If the vendor fails to deliver duly completed houses in accordance with 
the specifications of the sale and purchase agreement, the vendor, being the defaulting 
party, should pay corresponding damages and compensation or in the worst scenario, the 
banks should return back all moneys received including paying compensation to the 
aggrieved purchasers (Md. Dahlan and Aljunid, 2010, 2011).  
One of the issues relating to failed housing projects in Malaysia is this: the aggrieved 
purchasers in failed housing projects who obtained Islamic Home Financing through 
BBA are still required to settle the monthly instalments to the Islamic bank despite failure 
of the vendor to deliver vacant possession. If they (the purchasers) fail, they will be 
subject to legal actions or may be adjudged bankrupt. In this situation, in the opinion of 
the authors, BBA as approved by the SAC is invalid and inequitable affronting the 
principles of Shariah (Islamic Law). Islamic banks as the vendor should be held 
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responsible if failed housing projects occur; the Islamic banks should not blame the 
aggrieved purchasers for the occurrences of failed housing projects due to the faults of 
the developers.  
3 Questions to ponder 
There are some questions that can be raised following the above elaboration, viz., 
• Whether the SAC as a statutory public authority is duty bound and under a legal 
responsibility in approving Islamic banking and financial products to ensure public 
welfare, public benefit and well-being of the customer stakeholders?  
• Does the SAC as a public authority owe a legal responsibility to implement a duty to 
act fairly and reasonably, in good faith and observe rules of natural justice in the 
exercise of their power to the effect of ensuring the legality under Islamic law and 
equity for approving Islamic banking and financial products before the products can 
be applied by Islamic banks? 
• If so, whether the aggrieved customers for instance the purchasers in problematic and 
failed housing development projects have any cause of action and/or locus standi to 
sue the SAC and claim appropriate remedies (legal and equitable) for all the losses 
and injuries they suffered and incurred for all the negligence, breach of duty to act 
fairly and reasonably, failure to implement fairness in the decision-making process 
and/or breach of natural justice and good faith in approving Islamic banking and 
financial products? 
• Whether the ouster clauses under the IFSA and CBMA giving immunity to the SAC 
against any legal action can negate the power of the court for judicial review or other 
equitable relief?  
4 Objectives 
The objectives of this paper are as follows:  
• to examine the extent of legal liability and responsibility of the SAC toward the 
stakeholder customers in approving Islamic banking and financial products 
• to make certain recommendations insofar as the issue of legal liability and 
responsibility of the SAC in approving Islamic banking and financial products is 
concerned for the benefit and welfare of the stakeholders (for example the purchasers 
in housing development projects).  
5 The statutory provisions relating to the SAC 
The obligation to comply with Shariah (Islamic Law) in all the activities of the 
institutions carrying out Islamic banking business is clearly spelt out in section 28 IFSA. 
Section 28(1) IFSA (Duty of Institution to Ensure Compliance with Shariah) provides as 
follows:  
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“An institution shall at all times ensure that its aims and operations, business, 
affairs and activities are in compliance with Shariah”. 
Similarly this obligation is spelt out in section 28(2) IFSA, which reads:  
“For the purposes of this Act, a compliance with any ruling of the Shariah 
Advisory Council (SAC) in respect of any particular aim and operation, 
business, affair or activity shall be deemed to be a compliance with Shariah in 
respect of that aims and operations, business, affair or activity”. 
The word ‘institution’ in the above provision means an authorised person or operator or a 
designated payment system (section 27 IFSA). While the words ‘authorised person means 
a person licensed under section 10 or approved under section 11 to carry on an authorised 
business (section 2 IFSA). The word ‘operator’ and ‘designated payment system’ are, 
respectively, defined as ‘any person, acting alone or under an arrangement with another 
person, responsible for the rules, procedures and operations of a payment system’ and ‘a 
payment system prescribed as a designated payment system under subsection 39(1) 
(section 2 IFSA).  
Sections 10 and 11 IFSA meanwhile deal specifically on the grant of licence by the 
Minister and Approval by the Bank.  
An institution carrying out Islamic banking/financial business is under a 
responsibility to do certain acts once it found that the business that it carries out has 
contravened Shariah. The responsibility to act is prescribed by section 28(3) IFSA. 
Section 28(3) reads:  
“Where an institution becomes aware that it is carrying on any of its business, 
affair or activity in a manner which is not in compliance with Shariah or the 
advice of its Shariah committee or the advice or ruling of the SAC, the 
institution shall –”. 
a immediately notify the Bank and its Shariah committee of the fact 
b immediately cease from carrying on such business, affair or activity and 
 from taking on any other similar business, affair or activity  
c within thirty days of becoming aware of such non-compliance or such 
 further period as may be specified by the Bank, submit to the Bank a plan 
 on the rectification of the non-compliance” (emphasis added). 
As a sanction to the obligation to carry out the above prescribed duties, section 28(4) 
IFSA provides as follows:  
“Any person who contravenes subsection (1) or (3) commits an offence and 
shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eight 
years or to a fine not exceeding twenty-five million ringgit or to both” 
(emphasis added). 
SAC is a council established by BNM pursuant to section 51 CBMA. Section 51(1) 
CBMA (Establishment of SAC) provides:  
“The Bank may establish a SAC on Finance which shall be the authority for the 
ascertainment of Islamic law for the purposes of Islamic financial business”. 
The word ‘Bank’ here refers to the Central Bank of Malaysia or in Bahasa Malaysia is 
called ‘BNM’ (section 2 CBMA). 
The SAC shall be the authority for the ascertainment of Islamic Law for the purpose 
of Islamic banking/financial business (section 51 CBMA).  
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It is a duty of the BNM and IFIs to consult the SAC pursuant to sections 55(1) and 
55(2) CBMA in respect of Islamic banking and financial business and conducting its 
affairs. Section 55(1) CBMA states:  
“The Bank shall consult the SAC on any matter– 
a relating to Islamic financial business 
b for the purpose of carrying out its functions or conducting its business or 
 affairs under this Act or any other written law in accordance with the 
 Shariah, which requires the ascertainment of Islamic law by the Shariah 
 Advisory Council”. 
The purpose of consulting, referring and seeking advice from the SAC is to make sure 
that the Islamic banking and financial business and its affairs are conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of Shariah (section 55(2) CBMA). Section 55(2) 
CBMA provides:  
“Any Islamic financial institution in respect of its Islamic financial business, 
may– 
a refer for a ruling 
b  seek the advice 
of the SAC on the operations of its business in order to ascertain that it does 
not involve any element which is inconsistent with the Shariah”. 
Apart for sections 51 and 55, sections 56(1), 57 and 58 CBMA also prescribes that the 
rulings and advice of the SAC shall bind the IFIs, the BNM, the Shariah Committee, the 
court of law and the arbitrators on matters pertaining to Islamic financial matters.  
Section 56(1) (reference to SAC for ruling from court or arbitrator) CBMA provides: 
“Where in any proceedings relating to Islamic financial business before any 
court or arbitrator any question arises concerning a Shariah matter, the court 
or the arbitrator, as the case may be, shall– 
a take into consideration any published rulings of the SAC; or 
b refer such question to the SAC for its ruling” (emphasis added). 
Section 57 CBMA (Effect of Shariah rulings) states as follows:  
“Any ruling made by the SAC pursuant to a reference made under this Part 
shall be binding on the Islamic financial institutions under section 55 and the 
court or arbitrator making a reference under section 56” (emphasis added). 
While section 58 CBMA (SAC ruling prevails) provides:  
“Where the ruling given by a Shariah body or committee constituted in 
Malaysia by an Islamic financial institution is different from the ruling given by 
the Shariah Advisory Council, the ruling of the Shariah Advisory Council 
shall prevail” (emphasis added). 
Thus, pursuant to the above provisions, the rulings and advice of the SAC shall bind the 
IFIs, the court of law, the arbitrator and the Shariah committee. In other words, the new 
provision inserted in the CBMA in relation to the SAC, serve as an ouster clause to oust 
any jurisdiction and power of the court of law, any other Shariah committee of the IFIs 
and any other persons to challenge the rulings and advice of the SAC in respect of 
Islamic financial business and affairs (Md. Dahlan and Aljunid, 2010).  
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Apart from complying with Shariah and the SAC, the institution carrying out Islamic 
banking/financial business must follow the standards set out by the BNM and the SAC. 
This is mentioned in section 29. Failure to carry out this obligation will trigger certain 
punishment pursuant to section 29(6), which provides:  
“Any person who fails to comply with any standards specified under subsection 
(1), commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding eight years or to a fine not exceeding twenty-five million 
ringgit or to both.” 
Similarly, all persons, including the IFIs, are duty bound to comply with the directions 
(written circulars, guidelines and notices) of the BNM on any Shariah matter relating to 
the Islamic banking/financial business. These directions are made in accordance with the 
advice of the SAC. Any person who fails to comply with any of these directions, commit 
an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding three million ringgit 
(section 59(1)(2)(3) of the CBMA).  
In addition to the above, the IFIs must also comply with the advice of its internal 
Shariah Committee. This is spelt out under section 30(1) of the IFSA.  
It is noteworthy that the IFIs must also establish their own internal Shariah 
Committee to advise its business, affairs and activities in order to ensure that it complies 
with Shariah (section 30(1) of the IFSA). The duties and functions that the Shariah 
Committee carries out must also be consistent with the standards prescribed by the BNM 
(section 32 of the IFSA). 
6 Cases on the superiority and hegemony of the SAC 
The superiority and hegemony of the SAC over the court, the IFIs, the arbitrator and the 
Shariah Committee in relation to the Islamic banking/financial business and affairs has 
been given judicial support and recognition by recent cases namely:  
1 Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd lwn Rhea Zadani Corp Sdn Bhd dan lain-lain [2012] 10 MLJ 484 
(High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur); 
2 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd lwn Kong Sun Enterprise Sdn Bhd dan lain-lain [2012] 10 
MLJ 665 (High Court of Malaya at Johor Bahru)  
3 CIMB Islamic Bank Bhd v LCL Corp Bhd & Anor [2012] 3 MLJ 869 (High Court of Malaya 
at Kuala Lumpur) 
4 Kuwait Finance House (M) Bhd lwn Teknogaya Diversified Sdn Bhd dan lain-lain [2012] 9 
MLJ 433 (High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur)  
5 Mayban Trustees Bhd v CIMB Bank Bhd and other appeals [2012] 2 MLJ 187 [2012]  
6 MLJ 354 (Court of Appeal at Putrajaya) 
6 Mayban Trustees Bhd v CIMB Bank Bhd and other appeals [2012] 6 MLJ 354 (Court of 
Appeal at Putrajaya)  
7 Mohd Alias bin Ibrahim v RHB Bank Bhd & Anor [2012] 1 ShLR 23; [2011] 3 MLJ 26 
(High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur)  
8 Tan Sri Abdul Khalid bin Ibrahim v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd [2012] 1 ShLR 1; [2012]  
7 MLJ 597 (High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur) 
9 Tan Sri Abdul Khalid bin Ibrahim v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd [2013] 3 MLJ 269 (Court of 
Appeal at Putrajaya) 
10 Tan Sri Abdul Khalid bin Ibrahim v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd and another suit [2009]  
6 MLJ 416 (High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur). 
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7 Liability and responsibility of the SAC  
In the opinion of the authors, despite the absolute power and immunity that the SAC has 
in Islamic banking/financial business and affairs and its hegemony and superiority, it is 
submitted that the SAC is still subject to a legal duty, not just under Shariah, to act fairly 
and reasonably in the exercise of their powers. In other words, if it is proven that the SAC 
fails to execute its statutory duties fairly and reasonably to the detriment of the customer 
stakeholders, the latter shall have a cause of action and locus standi against the SAC and 
are entitled to certain legal and equitable remedies. This contention is made on the 
following grounds:  
• There exists a fiduciary duty on part of the SAC toward the public customer 
stakeholders in dispensing their public duties. For instance, in financing housing 
development projects, the public customers/stakeholders are the housing developers 
and the purchasers. 
• There exists a legitimate expectation on part of the customer stakeholders against the 
SAC in that the SAC should exercise its statutory and/or prerogative powers 
conferred by the IFSA and CBMA in a fair and reasonable manner in dispensing its 
statutory duties for the benefit of its stakeholders (for example the housing 
developers and the purchasers). 
• Even though the SAC has an absolute statutory power over the Islamic banking and 
financial business and affairs, this statutory power is not an unfettered one. This 
power is still subject to the principles of natural justice, equity, good faith and 
fairness.  
7.1 Fiduciary duty 
It is submitted that the duty of the SAC to exercise due care in exercising its duties under 
the IFSA and CBMA is a fiduciary one. The SAC should ensure that the outcome of its 
decision in Islamic banking/financial business and affairs would benefit the public 
customer stakeholders and should not cause any unnecessary and gratuitous problems to 
the customer stakeholders. 
This duty is enunciated in Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v Sagong bin Tasi & Ors 
[2005] 6 MLJ 289 (Court of Appeal). In this case, the State Government of Selangor  
(the first defendant-owner of all un-alienated land in the state) was held liable to have 
acquired the land (Bukit Tampoi) occupied and belonging to the plaintiffs (aboriginal 
peoples) with the second defendant (UEM Berhad), third defendant (Malaysian Highway 
Authority) and fourth defendant (Federal Government), by depriving the plaintiffs’ 
proprietary rights without adequate compensation in accordance with the Land 
Acquisition Act 1960 (‘LAA’). Secondly, the defendants were liable for having 
unlawfully evicted the plaintiffs from their lands as the 14-day notice was unreasonable 
and insufficient, not being compliant with the LAA procedure. The defendants were also 
liable for trespass.  
The first defendant had also breached their fiduciary duties in not having gazetted the 
un-gazetted area for the welfare and benefit of the plaintiffs as an aboriginal reserve area. 
They failed to gazette the area despite their knowledge and awareness that such  
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non-gazetted area was also occupied and needed by the plaintiffs to carry out their 
customary practices.  
The court held that the discretionary power of the State Authority or public body is 
not an unfettered one in light of its responsibility toward the welfare and in trust of its 
subjects (stakeholders). The exercise of the power must be in accordance with the law 
and for public good. Thus, it follows that they are fiduciary to the public.  
The above principles are also found in Australian cases in Mabo No 2 (Mabo & Ors v 
State of Queensland & Anor [1986] 64 ALR 1 and Wik People’s v The State of 
Queensland & Ors [1996] 187 CLR 1. In other parts of the commonwealth, this principle 
is also entrenched in many cases such as Premanchandra v Major Montague 
Jayawickrema [1994] 2 Sri LR 90. In this case at page 105, GPS De Silva CJ when 
delivering the judgement of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka said:  
“There are no absolute or unfettered discretions in public law; discretion are 
conferred on public functionaries in trust for the public, to be used for the 
public good, and the propriety of the exercise of such discretions is to be 
judged by reference to the purposes for which they were so entrusted” 
(emphasis added). 
In Malaysia, the above principle had also been adopted in Pengarah Tanah dan Galian 
Wilayah Persekutuan v Sri Lempah Enterprise Sdn. Bhd [1979] 1 MLJ 135 and 
Savrimuthu v Public Prosecutor [1987] 2 MLJ 173. 
It is submitted, a fiduciary duty exists on part of the SAC in exercise of its statutory 
powers in Islamic banking and financial business and affairs. Following this, it must 
obtain the requisite advice and views from all relevant parties (including the consumers 
and purchasers’ associations) and comply with the advice and views before approving 
any proposed Islamic banking and financial products. The SAC should also decide 
prudently in a reasonably manner supported by the advice of the appropriate segments of 
society before approving any Islamic banking and financial products. Even though based 
on the authors’ view there has not yet any case law pointing to this position, it is 
submitted the SAC is under a fiduciary duty in carrying out public duties, for instance in 
making decision in approving Islamic banking/financial products.  
7.2 Legitimate expectation 
Before elaborating on the above sub-heading, the authors would like to raise a question: 
Whether the aggrieved customer stakeholders in Islamic banking and financial business 
and affairs has a legitimate expectation against the SAC that the SAC would approve 
suitable, equitable, well-balanced and all-inclusive Islamic banking and financial 
products up to the extent of protecting the rights and interests of the customer 
stakeholders as well?  
The principle behind the doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the duty to 
act fairly as a necessity element or concomitant of good governance or good 
administration (Wade and Forsyth, 2000; Fiadjoe, 1999). The doctrine of legitimate 
expectation was initially recognised by Lord Denning in Schmidt v Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149 (CA) to denote something less than a right which may 
nevertheless be protected by the principles of natural justice; or an expectation of 
receiving some benefit or privilege to which the individual has no right. 
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In the Privy Council case of Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983]  
2 AC 629 (Privy Council (PC’)), Ng Yuen Shiu an illegal immigrant challenged a 
deportation order. He contended that the Hong Kong government had previously given an 
undertaking that each case would be considered on its merits and that he was denied the 
opportunity of being heard. The PC held that Ng had a legitimate expectation that a 
certain procedure would be followed and that it was in the interest of good administration 
that the authorities should act fairly by implementing its stated policy. Lord Fraser said 
that ‘legitimate expectation in this context is capable of including expectations which  
go beyond enforceable legal rights, provided they have some reasonable basis’. His 
Lordship identified three practical questions underlying all legitimate expectation cases. 
They are:  
• To what has the authority committed itself? 
• Has the authority acted unlawfully in respect of its commitment? 
• What should the court do about it?  
In Darahman bin Ibrahim & Ors v Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Perlis & Ors 
[2008] 4 MLJ 309, at page 333, the Court of Appeal said that where an applicant can 
demonstrate that a legitimate expectation has arisen, he has a powerful argument against 
a public body which has otherwise acted pursuant to the discretionary powers or duties 
lawfully conferred upon it. It is germane to state that a legitimate expectation in its 
procedural form arises where there has been a failure to follow an agreed or customary, 
process of consultation. In the main, it is concerned about the quality of the decision-
making process. The latter is called substantive legitimate expectation, while the former 
is known as procedural legitimate expectation.  
In Dr Michael Jeyakumar Devaraj v Ketua Pengarah Unit Penyelarasan 
Pelaksanaan di Jabatan Perdana Menteri & Ors [2011] 6 MLJ 824 (High Court at Kuala 
Lumpur), the argument of legitimate expectation was successfully pleaded by the 
applicant and the court agreed that legitimate expectation arose in the circumstance of 
this case. In this case, the court held the application of the applicant being a Member of 
Parliament for the Sungai Siput constituency for leave for judicial review against the 
decision of the respondents (being the Director General of the Implementation 
Coordination Unit (ICU) of the Prime Minister’s Department and the Director of the 
Perak State Development) who rejected the applicant’s application for funds from the 
special constituency allowance for schools, orphanage and aid to the orang asli was 
allowed by the court. The court stated that the exercise of discretion on part of the 
respondents in dealing with the application of the applicant may well be based on policy 
considerations within the management prerogative but the respondents evidently had 
acted capriciously and in breach of the legitimate expectation that they owed to the 
applicant, with bias and/or for improper purpose, had failed to take into account relevant 
factors and had taken into account irrelevant factors.  
In Sipadan Dive Sdn Bhd & Ors v The State government of the State of Sabah [2011] 
3 MLJ 357 (High Court of Borneo at Kota Kinabalu) again the court found that legitimate 
expectation existed on part of the State government toward the plaintiffs. In this case, the 
plaintiffs were awarded by the court compensation or damages as the defendant being the 
state government had breached the plaintiffs’ legitimate expectation in that the plaintiffs 
were not given reasonable notice to wind down their business that had resulted in the 
plaintiffs’ losses owing to the demolition of the plaintiffs’ buildings by the defendant and 
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losses of the plaintiffs’ equitable or proprietary interests in the plaintiffs’ diving resorts. 
The legitimate expectation was also created on the request of the defendant that the fifth 
plaintiff was to prepare a master plan proposed for Pulau Sipadan. Further, legitimate 
expectation existed when the plaintiffs were allowed to continue operating on Sipadan 
Island even after Malaysia had gained sovereignty over the island. Evidence which the 
plaintiffs relied on is that the defendant actively used the presence of the plaintiffs on the 
island to promote Malaysia’s tourism industry and to argue Malaysia’s sovereignty rights 
over the island at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Khan [1985] 1 All ER 40 
(Court of Appeal, Civil Division), Watkins LJ said at page 41 as follows:  
“where a member of the public affected by a decision of a public authority had 
a legitimate expectation based on a statement or undertaking by the 
authority that it would apply certain criteria or follow certain procedure in 
reaching its decision, the authority was under a duty to follow those criteria or 
procedures” (emphasis added).  
The case of R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan (Secretary of 
State for Health and another intervening) [2000] 3 All ER 850 provides an example of 
what amounts to substantive legitimate expectation. In this case, a tetraplegic victim of a 
road accident in 1993 was housed in a health institute called Mardon House, a NHS 
facility for the long term disabled. It was represented to the victim by the health authority 
that he could stay at Mardon House ‘for as long as they chose’. When the health authority 
decided to close Mardon House without providing alternative suitable accommodation, 
the Court of Appeal held that, in view of the representation, a breach of this legitimate 
expectation amounted to an abuse of power and the substantive promise was upheld.  
In Toh Huat Khay v Lim A Chang (in his capacity as the executor of the estate of Toh 
Hoy Khay, deceased) [2010] 4 MLJ 312 (Federal Court at Putrajaya), legitimate 
expectation existed on part of the State Authority to ensure that the requirements of the 
law relating to the land transfer must be observed and complied with. The court also held 
that owing to this the State Authority breached its fiduciary duty. In this case, the State 
Authority consented to a land transfer despite the fact that it is still subject to restrictions 
in interests of 10 years prohibition of sale, from the date of alienation. Owing to this, the 
court held that the transfer was null and void, despite there being a consent given by the 
State Authority. It follows that, according to the court, such a transfer could not give any 
indefeasibility of title to the transferee as the registration of the land was procured by 
means of an insufficient or void instrument pursuant to section 340(2)(b) of the NLC.  
Thus, following the above legal principle and courts’ decision, in the submission of 
the authors, the aggrieved customer stakeholders in Islamic banking and financial 
products have a legitimate expectation, procedurally and substantively, that the SAC, as a 
public authority, should have approved or should approve suitable Islamic banking 
products that can also give reciprocal protection to customer stakeholders’ rights and 
interests.  
It is submitted that the foundation for the creation of procedural and substantive 
legitimate expectation of the public toward the SAC is derived from the objectives of the 
Shariah (maqasid shariah) itself, i.e., to protect the rights and interests of the people in 
term of their life, wealth and the inherent responsibility of a public authority to exercise 
their duties for social justice, public good and public welfare and well-being.  
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From the above cases and discussion, the conclusion is that the SAC owes a fiduciary 
duty and that its subjects (customer stakeholders) have procedural and substantive 
legitimate expectation that it (the SAC) when approving Islamic banking and financial 
products would approve suitable, equitable, fair and all-inclusive products in a 
professional, fair and reasonable manner for the reciprocal benefits of the customer 
stakeholders.  
7.3 Ouster clauses 
There are cases that held ouster clause given to public authority is ineffective as against 
the power of the court for judicial review or other equitable relief. The immunity given 
by the ouster clause is shattered if the public authority has done some acts which is wrong 
in law. This proposition is supported by the following cases:  
1 Re Racal Communication [1981] 2 AC 374 
2 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 
3 Council of Civil Service Union v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374.  
The ground on which relief and remedies are given to the aggrieved parties has been 
succinctly summarised by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Union under three 
developed heads, viz., ‘illegality’, irrationality’ and ‘procedural impropriety’.  
Christopher Leong, President of the Malaysian Bar at the opening of the Legal Year 
2014 at Dewan Sri Siantan, Perbadanan Putrajaya on 11 January, 2014 said that (Leong, 
2014):  
“Ouster clauses are obnoxious, as they purport to confer absolute powers 
on the Executive and attempt to render the Judiciary subordinate. They 
are contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers that underpins the 
Federal Constitution and that is essential to, and inherent in, a modern 
democracy that professes and abides by the rule of law. Ouster clauses also 
undermine the rights of aggrieved parties to access justice. 
The Judiciary has in some cases stood up and denuded the efficacy of ouster 
clauses. One example is the landmark Court of Appeal case of Syarikat 
Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan. This decision is an affirmation of the oath that all 
judges take upon assuming office, that is, to preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution, and so may this continue” (emphasis added). 
In Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers’ Union [1995] 2 MLJ 
317 (Court of Appeal) at pages 336–344, Gopal Sri Ram JCA said:  
“The next topic that requires consideration is the ability of the High Court to 
exercise judicial review over awards of the court in the face of a privative 
clause. The attempt by Parliament to exclude judicial review is, in this instance, 
expressed in s 33B(1) of the Act … a preponderance of Malaysian authority, 
when dealing with the precursor to s 33B(1), favoured the view that the High 
Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to quash an administrative decision for an error 
of law not going to jurisdiction was not excluded by the ouster clause… 
In my opinion, the true principle may be stated as follows. An inferior 
tribunal or other decision making authority, whether exercising a quasi-
judicial function or purely an administrative function, has no jurisdiction 
to commit an error of law. Henceforth, it is no longer of concern whether 
the error of law is jurisdictional or not. If an inferior tribunal or other 
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public decision-taker does make such an error, then he exceeds his 
jurisdiction. So too is jurisdiction exceeded, where resort is had to an 
unfair procedure…or where the decision is reached is unreasonable, in the 
sense that no reasonable tribunal similarly circumstanced would have 
arrived at the impugned decision. 
It is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt an exhaustive definition of what 
amounts to an error of law, for the categories of such an error are not closed. 
But it may be safely said that an error of law would be disclosed if the decision-
maker asks himself the wrong decision or takes into account irrelevant 
considerations or omits to take into account relevant considerations…or if he 
misconstrues the terms of any relevant statute, or misapplies or misstates a 
principle of the general law.  
Since an inferior tribunal has no jurisdiction to make an error of law, its 
decision will not be immunised from judicial review by an ouster clause 
however widely drafted” (emphasis added). 
8 Conclusion and recommendations 
The authors are of the view that in approving Islamic banking and financial products,  
if proven that the products are not suitable and unfair to the customer stakeholders and 
that owing to this reason the customer stakeholders become aggrieved, the aggrieved 
customer stakeholders have a good cause of action and locus standi against the SAC if 
the latter had acted unreasonably, unfairly, in breach of natural justice and the legitimate 
expectation of the customer stakeholders and is mala fide. In this regard, the aggrieved 
customer stakeholders may claim for appropriate compensation and damages for all the 
calamities that have occurred owing to the failure of the SAC to carry out their statutory 
duties reasonably.  
It is submitted that an amendment should be made to the IFSA and CBMA to the 
effect of imposing an obligation on the SAC to be bound by the principles of 
administrative law and tortuous law in the decision-making process in considering and 
approving Islamic banking and financial products in Malaysia. Further, the SAC should 
also be responsible for all the decisions made and no immunity should be given to them if 
proven it has acted unreasonably, unfairly, in breach of natural justice and the legitimate 
expectation of the customer stakeholders and mala fide in carrying out their public duties. 
Apart from the legislative proposals above, it is the hope of the authors, there will be, 
in the near future, aggrieved customer stakeholders for an instance the failed housing 
projects’ purchasers or housing developers who may realise and with proof that their 
miserable plights are owing to the failure of the SAC to observe the duty to act fairly and 
reasonably in the exercise of its statutory power in approving Islamic home financial 
products to take certain legal actions against the defaulting SAC for some judicial 
remedies. Thus, the legal perimeter on the responsibility and liability in implementing 
public duties by the public bodies in Malaysia can be further defined and expounded by 
the guardian of the law itself.  
Finally, the ouster clause conferring immunity on the SAC, in the submission of the 
authors, is ineffective if the SAC, as a public authority in exercising its statutory duties, 
has transgressed the law, i.e., has acted unreasonably, unfairly, in breach of natural 
justice and the legitimate expectation of the customer stakeholders and mala fide in 
carrying out its public duties. 
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